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THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND ITS RELATION TO
A DECLARED PURPOSE OR POLICY
OF A STATUTE
THEODORE S. Cox•
The most distinctive and significant American contribution to
juridical theory is the doctrine of judicial review. Presidents and legislators, from the time of Mr. Jefferson to the present, have criticized it
severely. With some justice they have pointed to the fact that in the
Constitutional Convention the proposal to grant to the Supreme Court
the equivalent of the executive veto power was rejected.! Hence, successive critics have raised the cry of judicial usurpation. This criticism,
however, ignores three import:tnt facts. First, the Constitution itself in
declaring that the Constitution, and laws passed in pursuance thereof,
should be the supreme law of the land, states: "and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 2 Certainly, so far
as state action is concerned, this is a clear recognition of the authority
vested in the courts to examine the provisions of state constitutions or
state statutes in order to determine whether or not they conform to the·
Federal Constitution. This, of course, is judicial review. Secondly,.
statutory interpretation is an inherent judicial function. Where there·
is a document embodying the fundamental law which has been prom-·
ulgated by the power in which resides the ultimate sovereignty, there is
always a potential conflict between such document and statutes enacted in the ordinary process of legislation. The determination of this.
•Dean and Professor of Jurisprudence, College of William and Mary, Depart·
ment of Jurisprudence.
1
Many of the members of the Convention, however, were of the opinion that"
the Supreme Court would exercise judicial review regardless of the absence of a
specific provision authorizing it. This view that such power would be exercised is
strengthened by the provisions of Article Ill, Section 2, giving the judicial power of
the United States jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and.
treaties.
•u. s. Const. Art. VI.
1
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conflict obviously is within this inherent judical power. Thirdly, and
fundamentally, the doctrine of judicial review is the normal result of
the existence of a written constitution, the embodiment of the supreme
law of the land. This supreme law ipso facto must be superior to ordinary enactments by transient legislatures.
The origin of judicial review in America was not sudden; it was
the result of a slow historical development covering more than a hun·dred years. So far as the colonies were concerned, the basic fundamental law of each colony was its charter. A royal grant, the charter
-contained the powers, duties, obligations, and privileges conferred on
the colony. The enactments of the colonial assemblies were subject to
review by the crown and its agencies. With this colonial experience _it is
not surprising, therefore, to find the principle (that legislation was
subject to review) continued after independence. Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, there had been pronouncements to this effect by courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
North Carolina, and elsewhere. But the most complete formulation of
the doctrine of judical review was enunciated in Virginia in 1782. By
the constitution of Virginia a pardon for treason could be granted only
by the action of both branches of the Virginia assembly. A person
<:onvicted of treason was granted what he alleged to be a pardon, although it had been enacted by one house only. This alleged pardon being pleaded in a judicial proceeding, George Wythe,s Chancellor of
Virginia, held that no pardon had been granted, since the court was of
the opinion that the purported grant of the pardon by a single house
was intended by that house to remain inoperative unless concurred in
by the other house. But Chancellor Wythe went on to state: "Nay,
more, if the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated, should attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed to them by the people, I, in
administering the public justice of the country, will meet the united
powers at my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to the Constitution,
will say to them, 'here is the limit of your authority; and hither shall
you go but not further.' "4 This was five years before the meeting of
the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. While there is no evidence that John Marshall, during his very brief study of law under
Chancellor Wythe at the College of William and Mary, was consciously
•George Wythe, signer of the Declaration of Independence and a member of
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, was Professor of Law and Police at the
.College of William and Mary from 1779 to 1790 when he was succeeded by St.
George Tucker.
'Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5· 7 (Va. 1782).
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aware of the great Chancellor's attitude toward judicial review, it is
none the less interesting to speculate whether or not, perhaps, unconsciously, Marshall absorbed this legal philosophy from his instructor,
since it was Marshall who established the doctrine in American Constitutional Law, that the Supreme Court of the United States is supreme, necessarily possessing the power to review legislation.
Under the American theory of government, of course, there ar~
three separate departments. These three departments of government,.
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial are separate and distinct and are·
invested with separate grants of power. The character of these grants.
in the Federal Constitution is general and undefined, for example, in.
the several articles it is successively stated: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress ... The executive Power shall
be vested in a President ... the judicial Power of the United States
shall be vested in one supreme Court ... "5 In all these grants the
terms were not defined but they were, none the less, well known and
well recognized things; so well known and understood as to be unnecessary of further definition. It should not be overlooked that the
term judicial power as then used and understood included, of course.
the power of interpreting the law.
But, each of the three branches of the government were presumably
of equal dignity, and the members of the other departments were as.
much bound to support and defend the Constitution as was the judiciary. It is obvious, therefore, that the powers of the judiciary to declare
executive acts beyond the constitutional grant or to declare certain
legislative enactments not to be law, because they were not passed in
pursuance of the Constitution, were subject to certain restrictive principles. It is a matter of tremendous concern for one co-ordinate department of the government to declare that one of the other departments has acted beyond the constitutional power given it or has erroneously exerted its authority. It is a much graver charge for the court
to impugn the good faith of either of the other two departments. It
is fundamental, therefore, in determining the constitutionality of a
statute that the court proceed with the strongest kind of presumption
that the legislation is constitutional, that it will not be overturned
without clear evidence of its being beyond the limits granted to the
legislature by the Constitution, and that the court wherever possible
will so interpret the statute as to bring it within the constitutional
limitations.
"U. S. Const. Art. I, II, and III.

ISO
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There has been a tendency for the states to provide in their con.stitutions that the title of a statute shall cover its scope and that if matter be included in the statute which is not embraced by the title, such
-unincluded provisions must fail. For example, the Virginia constitu·tion provides, "no law shall embrace more than one subject which
.shall be expressed in its title ... " 6 The Federal Constitution, however,
is silent on this point, and this silence, unfortunately, has encouraged
.the undesirable practice of attaching riders to bills. But in any case
when a statute, federal or state, is before a court for interpretation,
!the purpose of the statute as indicated in its title and the policy of the
:statute (if the legislature has seen fit to include a declaration of policy)
become highly pertinent facts. Care should be taken, however, to distinguish between purpose or policy and the motive which prompted
the legislature to enact the statute. In determining the constitutionality of statutes, courts are concerned only with the question of constitutional power and the constitutional exercise of it. In such cases the
important questions before the court regarding its constitutionality
are, first, did the legislature possess the power to enact the statute, and
secondly, was this power exercised constitutionally? In other words,
a court in reviewing a tax statute, for example, of necessity, would
inquire two things: did the legislature have the power to tax the thing
taxed; is the purpose of the particular statute the raising of revenue?
If the legislature possessed the power to levy the tax and the statute is
for the purpose of raising revenue, the court cannot concern itself
with the wisdom, the expediency, or the motive of such statute. But,
if the statute obviously is for the purpose of regulation and not for the
purpose of raising revenue, it must fail unless the legislature possessed
the constitutional power to regulate. This would be true regardless of
a legislative declaration of purpose or policy.
In applying the general principles of statutory interpretation, the
court is entitled to believe that the legislature does not intend to exceed its powers and that the true purpose of the statute has been
stated in the title and the declaration of policy unless the contrary
is obvious.
Let us consider some of the leading cases involving the question of
the effect of a legislative declaration of purpose or policy on the question of the constitutionality of a statute. In the case of Minnesota v.
Barber,1 decided in 18go, the Supreme Court was confronted with the
•va. Const. § 52.
7
136 U.S. 313, 10 S. Ct. 862, 34 L. ed. 455 (18go).
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question of determining the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute
which required meat offered for sale for human consumption in Minnesota to be inspected by Minnesota inspectors within twenty-four
hours of slaughtering. Its purpose was described thus: "An act for the
protection of the public health by providing for inspection, before
slaughtering, of cattle, sheep and swine designed for slaughter for
human food." In holding the statute to be unconstitutional, as placing
an improper burden on interstate commerce, the court stated: "The
presumption that this statute was enacted in good faith, for the purpose
expressed in the title, namely to protect the health of the people of
Minnesota, cannot control the final determination of the question
whether it is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
There may be no purpose upon the part of a legislature to violate the
provisions of that instrument, and yet a statute enacted by it, under
forms of law, may, by its necessary operation, be destructive of rights
granted or secured by the Constitution. In such cases, the courts must
sustain the supreme law of the land by declaring the statute unconstitutional and void."B
In 1928 the principle enunciated in Minnesota v. Barber was applied in the Louisiana Shrimp Case.9 The act under consideration declared that all shrimp and parts thereof in Louisiana waters were property of the state. It was made unlawful to ship any shrimp from Louisiana without removing the heads and hulls, while it also was made unlawful to export any raw shells, heads, and hulls since they were "required to be manufactured into fertilizer or to be used as an element in
chicken-feed." The facts showed that 95%of the Louisiana shrimp was
intended for out of state consumption; that some shrimp bran was
made in Louisiana from heads and hulls, all of which was shipped out
of the state for use in making fertilizer; that no more than so% of the
hulls and heads removed in Louisiana was used for any purpose; and
that the heads and hulls had no market value and frequently became
a nuisance. The court held the statute to be unconstitutional as
amounting to a burdensome regulation of interstate commerce, stating:
"The facts alleged in the complaint, the details set forth on the plain8

136 U. S. 313, 319, 10 S. Ct. 862, 863, 34 L. ed. 455 (1890).
The court cited a long line of cases in support of this doctrine, quoting from
Henderson v. Mayor of the city of New York, 92 U. S. 259, 268, 23 L. ed. 543 (1875),
as follows: "in whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect."
"Foster-Fountain Packing Co. et al. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1, 49 S. Ct. 1, 73 L. ed.
147 (1928).
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tiffs' affidavits and the provisions of the Act to be restrained show that
the conservation of hulls and heads is a feigned and not a real purpose.
They support the plaintiffs' contention that the purpose of the enactment is to prevent the interstate movement of raw shrimp from the
Louisiana Marshes to the plants of Biloxi [Mississippi] in order through
commercial necessity to bring about the removal of the packing and
canning industries from Mississippi to Louisiana. The conditions imposed by the Act upon the interstate movement of the meat and other
products of shrimp are not intended, and do not operate, to conserve
them for the use of the people of the State."1o The court said further:
"One challenging the yalidity of a state enactment on the ground that
it is repugnant to the commerce clause is not necessarily bound by the
legislative declaration of purpose. It is open to him to show that in
their practical operation its provisions directly burden or destroy interstate commerce ... In determining what is interstate commerce, courts
look to practical considerations and the established course of business..."11
In 1904 in McCray v. United States12 with three justices dissenting,
the Supreme Court held constitutional a federal statute levying a tax
on colored oleomargarine at much greater rate than was levied on uncolored oleomargarine. The statute declared as its purpose the raising of revenue although neither the court nor the general public was
so naive as to believe that the declaration of purpose disclosed the real
legislative intent. But, the court, recognizing the deference due to an
enactment by a coordinate branch of the government, chose to treat
it as a valid exercise of the taxing power on the ground that the statute
on its face was intended to raise revenue rather than to regulate. Since
a statute which on its face is intended to produce revenue is none the
less a taxing statute even though little or no revenue is produced and
even though regulation results, the court refused to look behind the
purpose as manifested by the legislative declaration and by the statute as a whole. This probably was correct since the judicial power can_not extend to a consideration of the soundness of constitutional theory,
the wisdom of political action, or an undisclosed motive.
Fifteen years later the Supreme Court decided another important
case quite analogous to the McCray case. In United States v. Dore10
278 U. S. 1, 10, 49. S. Ct. 1, g, 7!1 L. ed. 147 (1928).
n278 U.S. 1, 10, 49 S. Ct. 1, g, 7!1 L. ed. 147 (1928), citing cases, among them Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 10 S. Ct. 862, 34 L. ed. 455 (18go); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 11 S. Ct. 213, 34 L. ed. 862 (1891).
"'195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L. ed. 78 (1904).
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mus}S the court held valid a federal statute placing a tax on the sale
of narcotics and establishing considerable control over such sales. Although the statute in its tenns declared that it was a revenue measure,
its constitutionality was questioned on the ground that it was not an exercise of the taxing power but was an attempt to regulate a matter beyond federal control. By a five to four decision the court viewed the
statute as a valid exercise of the taxing power since on its face it was a
revenue producing measure which was not refuted by the statute as a
whole, and beyond this point the court had no authority to inquire.
Ironically, the future justified the position of the majority of the court
in that the narcotic law has become a source of considerable revenue.14
In the case of Hill v. WallaceP decided in 1922, the Supreme Court
held invalid a federal statute which was declared to be "An Act taxing
contracts for the sale of grain for future delivery, and options for such
contracts, and providing for the regulation of boards of trade, and for
other purposes."16 Mr. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the court
stated: "It is impossible to escape the conviction from a full reading of
this law, that it was enacted for the purpose of regulating the conduct
of boards of trade through the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture and the use of an administrative tribunal consisting of that
Secretary, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General. Indeed, the title of the act recites that one of its provisions is the regulation of the boards of trade."1 7 Since the act sought to regulate a matter
not shown to be subject to federal regulation, namely, intrastate commerce, the court held the statute beyond the federal authority. The
court held that the Child Labor Tax 18 case completely covered the case
13

249 U. S. 86, 39 S. Ct. 214, 63 L. ed. 493 (1919).
,.Other pertinent decisions are Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5, 45 S. Ct.
446 (1925), where it was held that the practice of a profession could not be regulated
by the United States under pretext of raising revenue; United States v. Constantine,
296 U. S. 287, 56 S. Ct. 223, So L. ed. 233 (1935) where it was held that "Con·
gress in the guise of a taxing statute could not impose sanctions for violation of
state law respecting the local sale of liquor;" and the Child Labor Tax case, 259 U.
S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449• 66 L. ed. 817 (1922), in which a statute entitled "An Act to provide revenue and for other purposes" imposing a "tax" on persons knowingly employing children below certain ages in certain industries while those unknowingly doing the same thing were not subjected to the "tax" was held to be unconstitutional, the court taking the position that this alleged "tax" was in effect a penalty
and was intended to regulate and not to raise revenue and stating, "scienter is associated with penalties not with taxes."
,.259 U. S. 44• 42 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922).
15
Italics, the Court's.
17
259 U. S. 44, 66, 42 S. Ct. 453, 457, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922).
15
259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449• 66 L. ed. 817 (1922).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

in hand and quoted from the former as follows: "Out of a proper respect for the acts of a coordinate branch of the Government, the court
has gone far to sustain taxing acts as such, even though there has been
ground for suspecting from the weight of the tax it was intended to
destroy its subject. But in the act before us, the presumption of validity
cannot prevail, because the proof of the contrary is found on the very
face of its provisions. Grant the validity of this law and all that Congress would need to do, hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control
any one of the great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction
of which the states have never parted with, and which are reserved to
them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure
of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax
upon departures from it. To give such magic to the word 'tax' would
be to break down all constitutional limitations to the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States."19
A study of these cases suggests the quandary in which the courts are
placed: either they must accept the declared purpose and policy of the
legislature as controlling, even though the whole statute indicates
something entirely different, or else they must declare that the legislature has committed an error or has been guilty of bad faith. There
seems to be but one course for the courts to follow and that is for them,
as they have done in the past, to view the statute as a whole and determine whether or not by any possibility it can be interpreted in accordance with the declared legislative purpose or policy. If this can be done,
of course, in light of general principles of statutory construction, the
statute will be held to be constitutional, but if the declared purpose
and policy are at complete variance with the actual character of the
statute and its operation, the court would be derelict if it relied solely
on such declaration of purpose and policy. In fact such a view would
be stultifying. To impugn the motives and good faith of a coordinate
branch of the government, surely is a very serious matter, but to permit unconstitutional legislation to hide behind the cloak of a title or
a declaration of policy is reprehensible.
The problem is aggravated when in addition to a declaration of
purpose or policy the legislature includes a finding of fact. For example,
after the Futures Trading Act was declared unconstitutional,2o Congress enacted another statute, the Grain Futures Act in which were recited congressional findings of fact that: transactions known as "fu'"259 U.S. 20, S7• 42 S. Ct. 449· 450, 66 L. eel. 817 (1922) .
..,Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44• 42 S. Ct. 45S· 66 L. eel. 822 (1922).
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tures" were affected with the public interest; they were susceptible to
speculation, manipulation, and control; sudden and unreasonable
fluctuations in price frequently resulted; such fluctuations in price
were an obstruction to and a burden on interstate commerce; and that
regulation was imperative to protect such commerce and the national
public interest therein. The statute came before the court in the case
of Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, et al. v. Olsen, et al., 2 1 decided in 1923. Mr. Chief Justice Taft again speaking for the court compared the instant case with Hill v. Wallace and quoting from the latter said: "It follows that sales for future delivery on the Board of Trade
are not in and of themselves interstate commerce. They cannot come
within the regulatory power of Congress as such, unless they are regarded by Congress, from the evidence before it, as directly interfering
with interstate commerce so as to be an obstruction or burden thereon."22 The court held that the Grain Futures Act differed from the
Futures Trading Act "in having the very features the absence of which"
prevented the court from sustaining the earlier legislation.
Continuing its opinion, the court quoted from Stafford v. W allace23 as follows: "Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice,
and threatens to obstruct or unduly burden the freedom of interstate
commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide
the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such a matter unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are
clearly non-existent." Then said the court, "in the act we are considering, Congress has expressly declared that transactions and prices of
grain in dealing in futures are susceptible to speculations, manipulations and control which are detrimental to the producer and consumer
and persons handling grain in interstate commerce and render regulation imperative for the production of such commerce and the national public interest therein." "It is clear" continued the court, "from
the citations in the statement of the case, of evidence before committees of investigation as to manipulations of the futures market and
their effect, that we would be unwarranted in rejecting the finding of
Congress as unreasonable, and that in our inquiry as to the validity of
this legislation we must accept the view that such manipulation does
~62 U.S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470, 67 L. ed. 839 (1923).
""262 U. S. 1, 32, 43 S. Ct. 470, 476, 67 L. ed. 839 (1923).
~58 U. S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. ed. 735 (1922).

186

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

work to the detriment of producers, consumers, shippers, and legitimate dealers in interstate commerce in grain and that it is a real
abuse."24 Two justices dissented from this opinion. The conclusion
seems inescapable that a legislative finding of fact declared in a statute
unless obviously false may result in the statute's being held constitutional when without such declaration the statute might be held void.
Somewhat similar to the two cases of Hill v. Wallace and Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago v. Olsen are the cases dealing with the
Agricultural Adjustment Act and the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. The former was considered in 1935 in the case of United
States v. Butler. 21S The Agricultural Adjustment Act declared that an
economic emergency existed "due to the disparity of farm prices and
those of other commodities, reducing farmers' purchasing power thus
affecting transactions in farm commodities, burdening and obstructing interstate commerce." The act further declared that it was the
policy of Congress to establish and maintain such balance between the
production and consumption of agricultural commodities and such
marketing conditions therefor as well as reestablish prices to fanners
at a level that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power
with respect to articles that farmers buy equivalent to the purchasing
power of agricultural commodities in the past period. The technique
employed was the levying of an alleged processing tax. Interestingly
enough the government did not seek to have this statute upheld on the
ground of regulating interstate commerce (despite the mention of it
in the act) but sought to have it upheld as a valid tax. The court, with
three justices dissenting, held that as a matter of fact the statute sought
to regulate agricultural production and that the alleged tax was a mere
incident, a means to that end. Since the majority of the coun was of
the opinion that regulation of agricultural production was beyond the
power of the Federal Government to regulate, the statute was held unconsti tu tiona!. 26
Undaunted, Congress in 1937 enacted the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act and declared that "the disruption of the orderly exchange of commodities in interstate commerce impairs the purchasing
..262 U. S. 1, S7• 4S S. Ct. 470, 477• 67 L. ed. 839 (1923).
'"297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, So L. ed. 477 (1936).
00
Mr. Justice Stone in his dissent which was joined in by Mr. Justice Brendeis
and Mr. Justice Cardozo, stated: "While unconstitutional exercise of power by the
executive and legislative branches of the Government is subject to judicial restraint,
the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint."
297 U.S. 1, 78, 56 S. Ct. 312, 325, SoL. ed. 477 (1936).
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power of the farmers." Such interference was declared in the statute to
"burden and obstruct the normal channels of interstate commerce."
And it was stated that it was the congressional policy, by the use of
power delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture "to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities
in interstate commerce as will establish prices to farmers at a level
that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power
of agricultural commodities in the base period .. ·.''27 The Supreme
Court, by a five to four decision, upheld the constitutionality of the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act in the case of United States v.
Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., et al.,2 B which concerned marketing agreements affecting the production and distribution of milk.29
The constitutionality of the Agricultural Marketing Agreements
Act was again upheld in the case of H. P. Hood and Sons v. United
States} 0 decided at the same time. Mr. Justice Roberts dissented on the
ground that there had been an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Agriculture. He maintained that there
was no standard by which such administrative action was confined or
executed, and that the only guide in respect to the choice of method
which the Secretary of Agriculture might select for raising the price
of milk was the declaration of policy embodied in the statute.31 Here
"'With certain exceptions, as in the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the base
period was fixed at August, 1gog, to July, 1914, or if it was impossible to determine
such period then the period 1919 to 1929.
'"307 U. S. 533• 59 S. Ct. 993, 83 L. ed. 1446 (1939).
"'Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler dissented, stating: "First,
Congress possesses the powers delegated by the Constitution-no others. The opinion
of this court in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935), 295 U. S.
495· 79 L. ed. 1507, 55 S. Ct. 837, 97 A. L. R. 947, noteworthy because of modernity
and reaffirmation of ancient doctrine-sufficiently demonstrates the absence of congressional authority to manage private business affairs under the transparent guise
of regulating interstate commerce. True, production and distribution of milk are
most important enterprises, not easy of wise execution; but so is breeding the cows,
authors of the commodity, also sowing and reaping the fodder which inspires them."
307 U. S. 533· 582, 59 S. Ct. 993· 1017, 83 L. ed. 1446 (1939).
The dissenting justices stated further that even if this power were possessed by
Congress it could not be delegated to another. Such delegation of power "to the
Secretary of Agriculture allowing him to "prescribe according to his own errant will
and then to execute" was "not government by law but by caprice." Mr. Justice
Roberts, dissenting, maintained that the act was so administered, contrary to the
terms of the statute, that all producers did not receive uniform prices for milk, thus
the small handlers, placed at the mercy of the large ones, were destroyed and denied
due process of law.
30
307 U. S. 588, 59 S. Ct. 1019, 83 L. ed. 1478 (1939).
31
Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler joined in this dissent. 307 U.S.
588, 603, 59 S. Ct. 1019, 1027, 83 L. ed. 1478 (1939).
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there is injected a new suggestion as to the effect of a legislative declaration of policy on the question of administrative action. It seems
highly doubtful that this case was intended as authority for any such
principle that a declaration of policy might replace a standard for administrative action.
In the field of public utilities we also are confronted with the effect
of a legislative finding of fact on the constitutionality of legislative enactments. It is a truism that a business which is not by nature and
character a public utility cannot be converted into one by legislative
fiat. There have been instances in which legislatures have declared
certain businesses to be public utilities which, by the nature and
character of their holding out, were not, as a matter of fact, public
utilities. Despite such legislative pronouncements, the courts have declared such statutes unconstitutional. But when a business once not
considered one affected with a public interest oecomes generally so
considered, it would seem that a legislative finding of fact to that effect
becomes of tremendous significance in a question of the constitutionality of the statute. Perhaps one should mention in passing a comparison of a legislative conclusion of law, for example, that a particular
business is a public utility, with a legislative finding of fact which will
support such conclusion of law.
The courts seem to have been impartial in holding unconstitutional
legislation which, as a matter of fact, denies the declared constitutional
purpose and policy since both federal and state statutes of this type
have been declared invalid. There seems not to have been any greater
tendency to declare state legislation unconstitutional because of an
attempt by state legislatures to enact unconstitutional legislation behind the cloak of a declared purpose or policy than there has been in
federal legislation, although probably there may have been in the mind
of the court a belief that congressional legislation, since enacted by a
coordinate branch of the government, is entitled to greater deference
and consideration where declarations of purpose or policy and findings of fact have been included in such legislation. The Supreme Court
seems to have been reasonably consistent, for in all the cases it has not
been the declaration of purpose or policy alone that has been the determining factor, but such declaration coupled with the nature, character, operation and effect of the entire statute. In those cases dealing
with the declaration of the finding of fact by Congress, such declaration seems to have been given greater weight in that the court has been
unwilling to presume to doubt the correctness of this finding of fact
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unless there is no evidence to support it. It seems as if the court has
applied here, the principle which is applied to administrative findings
of fact, that such finding of fact will be accepted by the court unless
from the evidence before it, such administrative body could not have
arrived at the decision which it reached.
Let us consider by way of summary three types of statutes, one without a declaration of policy, another with such declaration, and still
another with a legislative finding of fact added. In all three, of course,
the presumption is in favor of their constitutionality:, but in the second
case a declared policy may result in a statute's being held constitutional
when without it the opposite conclusion might be reached, since such
declaration clarifies the legislative intent. And in the third case the
likelihood of the statute's being held valid is enhanced, since the
legislative finding of fact (unless arbitrary and without evidence)
showing that the matter falls within the legislative power, supports
the legislature's assumption of authority over it.
The position, therefore, of the court seems generally sound. It is
inconceivable that a statute which actually, by nature and by operation, was intended to do one thing and attempts to do that thing should
be held constitutional, if as a matter of fact it is unconstitutional,
merely because the legislature has declared substantially that black is
white. It is something like "a rose by any other name." Perhaps this
attempt by a legislature to do something it feels would not receive
sanction when reviewed by the courts, by including a declaration of
purpose or policy quite different, would not exist were it not for judicial review. It is, perhaps, not too unreasonable to assume that did the
responsibility for the constitutionality of legislation not rest ultimately
on the courts the legislators might assume greater responsibility, to the
end ~at legislation of doubtful constitutionality be not enacted. Unfortunately, even in the recent past, there have been instances where
the executive and legislative branches both have presumed to secure
enactment of legislation, regardless of any doubts of constitutionality,
no matter how reasonable such doubts may have been. Such an attempt
scarcely is calculated to impress the citizen with either the legal wisdom
or good faith of such reckless proponents of doubtful legislation.
It is certainly true that a great deal of legislation inconsistent with
the Constitution would have been allowed to stand had the courts been
willing to accept as conclusive the legislative declarations of purpose
and policy. If the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, as by
its own terms it is declared to be, and if statutes enacted by transient
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legislatures must conform to the fundamental law in order to be valid,
and if the interpretation of such fundamental law and the statutes purportedly passed in pursuance thereof is a function of the judiciary, the
courts must continue to hold unconstitutional legislative enactments
which transcend the Constitution, even to the extent of looking behind
the declaration of legislative purpose or policy when such declarations
and the statutes themselves are irreconcilable. This they must do even
though in the doing they question legislative good faith.

